Composition of Capital Flows: A Survey by Koralai Kirabaeva & Assaf Razin
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES










The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2010 by Koralai Kirabaeva and Assaf Razin. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice,
is given to the source.Composition of Capital Flows: A Survey
Koralai Kirabaeva and Assaf Razin
NBER Working Paper No. 16492
October 2010, Revised November 2010
JEL No. F3
ABSTRACT
We survey several mechanisms that explain the composition of international capital flows: foreign
direct investment, foreign portfolio investment and debt flows (bank loans and bonds). We focus on
information frictions such as adverse selection and moral hazard, and exposure to liquidity shocks,
and discuss the following implications for composition of capital flows: 1. home court information
advantage; 2. panic-based capital-flow reversals; 3. information-liquidity trade-off in the presence
of source and host country liquidity shocks; 4. moral hazard in international debt contracts; and 5.





Ottawa ON K1A 0G9 Canada









Economists tend to favor capital mobility across national borders as it allows capital to
seek out the highest rate of return. Unrestricted capital ￿ ows further o⁄er several advan-
tages. First, international ￿ ows reduce the risk through the diversi￿cation of lending and
investment. Second, the global integration of capital markets can contribute to the spread
of best practices in corporate governance, accounting standards, and legal practices. Third,
the global mobility of capital limits the ability of governments to pursue bad policies. In an
integrated world capital market with perfect information, all forms of capital ￿ ows would
be indistinguishable. Information frictions and incomplete risk sharing are important ele-
ments needed to di⁄erentiate between equity and debt ￿ ows, and between di⁄erent types
of equities.
Capital ￿ ows can be classi￿ed into the following types: foreign direct investment (FDI),
foreign portfolio investment (FPI), and debt. Capital ￿ ows that have equity-like features
(FDI and FPI) are presumed to be more stable and less prone to reversals. Among equity
￿ ows, FDI yields more bene￿ts than others because it comes with more direct control
of management. In contrast, foreign debt ￿ ows, consisting of bank loans and bonds, are
regarded as more volatile.
The purpose of this survey is to elucidate some important mechanisms that explain the
composition of capital ￿ ows among these major types.
1. With information asymmetry between foreign and domestic investors, a country which
￿nances its domestic investment through foreign debt or foreign equity portfolio ￿ ows, will
ine¢ ciently allocate its capital. FDI, however, have potential to generate an e¢ cient level
of domestic investment.
2. Exposure to liquidity shocks makes ￿nancial institutions vulnerable to runs by do-
mestic investors and foreign creditors. The maturity mismatch when long-term investment
are ￿nanced with short-term debt may induce and exacerbate ￿nancial crisis and lead to
sudden reversals of short-term international capital ￿ ows.
3. When there is asymmetric information between sellers and buyers in the capital mar-
ket, foreign direct investment is associated with higher liquidation costs due to the adverse
selection. The exposure to liquidity shocks a⁄ects the volume of foreign direct investment
2￿ ows relative to portfolio investment ￿ ows. Thus, the trade-o⁄ between information and
liquidity helps to explain the composition of equity ￿ ows between developed and emerging
countries, as well as the patterns of FDI ￿ ows during ￿nancial crises. In particular, it ex-
plains why the developing countries tend to attract a larger share of capital in the form of
FDI than the developed countries.
4. The asymmetric information between domestic investors (as borrowers) and foreign
investors (as lenders) with respect to investment allocation leads to moral hazard and thus
generates an inadequate amount of borrowing. The moral hazard problem, coupled with
limited enforcement, can explain why countries experience debt out￿ ows in a low income
period, in contrast to the predictions of the complete-market paradigm.
5. Under the risk-diversi￿cation motive, with home bias in goods and assets, bond
holdings better hedge against real exchange rate risks, while holdings of equities, skewed
towards domestic equities, hedge against non-￿nancial income ￿ uctuations.
The organization of the survey is as follows. In section 2, we describe the pecking order
between FDI, FPI, and debt in the presence of home court information advantage. Section 3
surveys panic-based models of bank loans. Section 4 highlights the distinction between FDI
and FPI in the presence of asymmetric information and liquidity risks. Section 5 captures
the e⁄ect of moral hazard in international debt contracts. Section 6 focuses on models with
home bias in goods and services. Section 7 concludes.
2 Home-court information advantage
Strong evidence exist that there is a home-court advantage in international portfolio in-
vestment. One explanation is an information asymmetry between domestic and foreign
investors about expected performance of domestic ￿rms. As we demonstrate below, an
information asymmetry can cause an aggregate production ine¢ ciency, and lead to the for-
eign under-investment and domestic over-saving. As a result, the marginal productivity of
capital at home is high relative to the home country marginal cost of importing capital.
Empirical studies by Portes, Rey and Oh [39], and Loungani, Mody and Razin [34]
suggest that informational asymmetries signi￿cantly contribute to the negative relationship
3between asset trade and distance. The gravity models predict that bilateral international
transactions are positively related to the size of the two economies and negatively to the
distance between them. Distance is measured as a proxy for informational frictions, trans-
action and transportation costs.
In Froot and Stein [19], Klein and Rosengren [29], Klein, Peek, and Rosengren [28],
the hypothesis is that FDI is information intensive, and thus FDI investors, who know
more about their investments than outsiders, face a problem in raising resources for their
investments. Gordon and Bovenberg [24] assume asymmetric information between domestic
investors and foreign investors to explain the home bias phenomenon. Razin and Sadka [40]
analyze the gains from FDI when foreign direct investors have superior information on the
fundamentals of their investment, relative to foreign portfolio investors.
Razin, Sadka and Yuen [41] explored a pecking order among the three types of capital
￿ ows: debt, equity, and FDI in the context of a model in which domestic savers and FDI
investors are endowed with better information than the portfolio foreign investors. The
ranking of capital in￿ ows is somewhat similar to the pecking order￿of corporate capital
structure. Recall that in corporate ￿nance the hypothesis maintains that the ￿rms prefer
internal ￿nance (retained earnings, the analogue of FDI in the case of international ￿ ows)
to external ￿nance. If the latter is required, then ￿rms will issue the safest security (the
analogue of debt ￿ ows), and they will issue new equity (the analogue of equity portfolio
￿ ows) only as a last resort.
2.1 A Pecking order
Razin, Sadka, and Yuen (1998) consider a small, capital-importing country referred as a
home country. There are  ex-ante risk-neutral identical domestic ￿rms. There are two
time periods. Each ￿rm chooses capital input  in the ￿rst period. In the second period, the
output is equal to ()(1+), where (￿) is a production function exhibiting diminishing
marginal productivity of capital and  is a random productivity factor. The productivity
factor  is independent across ￿rms, it has zero mean and bounded below by ¬1. The
cumulative distribution function of the productivity shock  is ￿(￿). The domestic interest
rate is denoted by  and foreign by ￿.
42.1.1 Foreign Debt Investment
Investment decisions through debt ￿nance are made by ￿rms before  is observed. Given
its investment decision () at a stage where uncertainty is unresolved, a ￿rm may choose
to default on its debt if ()(1 + ) is smaller than (1 + ). Therefore, ￿rms with
productivity   0 will fully repay their non-recourse loans, where 0 is a threshold level
of , such that ()(1+0) = (1+). So, the fraction of solvent ￿rms is  (1 ¬ ￿(0)).
Assume that domestic ￿rms are better informed than the foreign lenders. They are
able to observe productivity  before making their loan decisions. Thus domestic lenders
will extend loans only to ￿rms with productivity   0. In contrast, foreign lenders will
advance loans to all ￿rms since they do not observe  at this stage. Denote the fraction
of solvent ￿rms ￿nanced by foreign lenders by ￿. Therefore, the expected payo⁄ of foreign
lenders is given by
Payo⁄￿ ￿ (1 ¬ ￿(0))(1 + ) + ￿(0) ()(1 + ¬) (1)
where ¬ ￿  [j ￿ 0]. The amount of loans given by foreign lenders is given by
 ￿ (￿ (1 ¬ ￿(0)) + ￿(0)).
The expected value of the representative ￿rm
 ￿  () ¬
￿
(1 ¬ ￿(0))(1 + ) + ￿(0) ()(1 + ¬)
￿
 (2)
Accordingly, the value maximizing level of  is such that
0 () =
(1 ¬ ￿(0))(1 + )
1 ¬ ￿(0)(1 + ¬)
 (3)
which implies that due to the possibility of default,
0 ()  1 +  (4)
This inequality represents an oversaving ine¢ ciency: domestic stock of capital is larger
than what domestic savers are willing to pay for in terms of foregone present consumption.
The expected payo⁄of the foreign lender should be equal to the capital income on loans,
which implies that ￿   and
0 ()  1 + ￿ (5)
5This means that aggregate production is ine¢ cient and the country can potentially gain
from the debt-￿nanced increase in the stock of domestic capital.
Although debt instruments specify that the issuer of these instruments must pay a
￿xed value, in the case of default the lender becomes an equity holder. Thus ine¢ cient
foreign ￿nancing also applies to foreign portfolio investment, as we demonstrate in the next
subsection.
2.1.2 Foreign Portfolio Investment
As before, all ￿rms choose investment level  in the ￿rst period before the random produc-
tivity factor  is observed. All ￿rms are originally owned by domestic investors, who equity
￿nance their capital investment. Foreign investors do not observe the productivity  when
they purchase shares in existing ￿rms. Therefore, they o⁄er to buy at the same price all
￿rms, with low and high productivity. The price therefore re￿ ects the average productivity
of the ￿rms foreigners invest in. As a result, there is a threshold level of productivity 0
such that initial owners of ￿rms whose productivity above 0 will not be willing to sell at
that price.
The value of the representative ￿rm is equal to ()(1 + ). Thus the threshold pro-







If foreigners have positive holdings in domestic ￿rms, then it is necessary that ￿   .

















+ (1 ¬ ￿(0))
0()(1 + +)
(1 + )
¬ 1 = 0 (9)
6Because the ￿rm knows, when making its capital investment decision, that it will be sold
at a premium if faced with low-productivity events, it tends to overinvest relative to the
rate of return to domestic investors and under-invest relative to the rate of return to foreign
investors,
(1 + ￿)  0()  (1 + ) (10)
As in the case with debt ￿ ows, the information asymmetry between domestic and for-
eign investors creates ine¢ ciencies, such as over-saving by domestic investors and under-
investment by foreigners, that reduce the gains from international capital ￿ ows.
2.1.3 Foreign Direct Investment
The foreign direct investor buys a domestic ￿rm before the investment decision is made. So,
the foreign investors and direct investors are equally informed. The capital ￿ is imported
from the foreign country, and the output is (￿)(1 + )  is the number of ￿rms bought





Therefore, the amount of foreign direct investment is given by
 = (￿ +  ￿) (12)
In an equilibrium with positive number of ￿rms owned by both domestic and foreign
investors,  ￿ =  , where  =
()
(1+) ¬ 
The optimal level of capital investment ￿ and  should satisfy
0(￿) = 1 + ￿ (13)
0() = 1 + 
When FDI investors have access to the domestic debt market then  = ￿ and we get
0(￿) = (1 + ￿) = 0() = 1 + . That is, global capital markets are e¢ cient. In the
case of FDI, the asymmetric information problems are alleviated due to the actual exercise
of management and control.
73 Debt Flows
Debt ￿ ows remain the dominant form of ￿ ows to developing economies, although their rel-
ative importance has declined over time. The empirical literature on ￿nancial globalization
documents a systematic empirical link between exposure to debt ￿ ows and the likelihood
and severity of ￿nancial crises. Rodrik and Velasco [42] ￿nd that countries with a larger
short-term debt stock than reserves are more likely to experience a ￿nancial ￿ ows reversal.
Tong and Wei [45] ￿nd that a large pre-crisis exposure to non-FDI capital in￿ ows tends to
be associated with a more severe credit crunch during the crisis. However, debt ￿ ows can be
bene￿cial in certain circumstances. A country that has no access to equity or FDI in￿ ows,
might still be able to bene￿t from debt in￿ ows to ￿nance illiquid investments (Diamond
and Rajan [15]).1
Wei [48] argues that sudden reversals of capital ￿ ows are more likely to occur among
countries that rely relatively more on portfolio debt ￿ ows, including bank loans, and less
on FDI. Moreover, short-term bank loans to developing countries tend to increase during
booms and rapidly decrease during economic slowdowns. Claessens, Dooley and Warner [11]
￿nd that long-term debt ￿ ows are often as volatile as short-term ￿ ows. The procyclicality
and high volatility of debt ￿ ows can lead to ine¢ cient capital allocation and generate moral
hazard. McKinnon and Pill [35] show ￿nancial liberalization without adequate supervision
can result in over-borrowing by banks. Furthermore, banks may expose their balance sheets
to currency risk if taking speculative open positions in foreign exchange are permitted.
3.1 Bank Loans and Banking Crises
Banks engage in maturity transformation: consumers deposit money in their bank account,
and banks invest a part of these deposits in long-term investments. Therefore, there is a
mismatch between the maturities of the liquid deposits of the consumers and the illiquid
investments of the bank. Such maturity mismatch makes them vulnerable to bank runs. If
too many consumers decide to withdraw their funds simultaneously from a bank, the bank
may fail. Diamond and Dybvig [14] demonstrate that (with common knowledge about
1See Kose, Prasad, Rogo⁄, and Wei [30] for a survey of the literature on the volatility and risk of debt
￿ ows.
8the fundamentals of investment returns), there is a possibility of self-ful￿lling bank run
equilibrium.
3.1.1 Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model
There are three periods (012), one good, and a continuum [01] of consumers. Each
consumer is born in period 0 with endowment of one unit of the good. Consumption occurs
only in periods 1 or 2 (1 and 2 denote corresponding consumption levels). Each consumer
can be of two types: with probability ￿ the consumer is impatient and with probability
(1 ¬ ￿) is patient. Consumers privately learn their types at the beginning of period 1,
and their types are .2 Impatient agents derive utility only from consumption in period
1, (1). Patient agents can consume at either period. The expected utility is given by
￿u(1) + (1 ¬ ￿)(2). There is a productive long-term technology: for each unit of input
in period 0, the technology generates 1 unit of output in period 1 or  units of output in
period 2 where   1.
A bank o⁄ers demand deposit contracts to consumers. Each consumer deposits his
endowment in the bank in period 0. The contract gives a depositor the right to withdraw
his deposit in period 1, and to receive a ￿xed payment 1 which is larger than the short-
run return of 1. However, if a depositor waits until period 2, he receives a random payo⁄
of 2 which is amount of non-liquidated investments divided by the number of remaining
depositors. These payments are maintained as long as the bank has enough resources to
pay every depositor who withdraws early. If the bank does not have su¢ cient amount of
resources, it liquidates all the investments and divides them among consumers who demand
withdrawal in period 1. In that case, consumers who wait until period 2 receive nothing.





 (1), all patient
consumers would prefer to wait until period 2. This is the ￿rst-best equilibrium. There
exists also a second equilibrium in which all consumers demand early withdrawal. When
they do so, the ￿rst period payment is 1 = 1 and the second period payment is 2 = 0. In
this case, it is indeed optimal for consumers to withdraw their deposits early.
Therefore, if there is common knowledge about the fundamentals, there exist multiple
2Since there is no aggregate uncertainty, ￿ is also a fraction of impatient consumers in the economy.
9equilibria. This means that at each realization of the fundamental, consumers may coor-
dinate on any one of these multiple equilibria. Bank runs arise because of a coordination
failure. When many run on the bank, it can fail due to the illiquidity generated by the run.
Figure 1 illustrates the welfare levels for (i) autarky equilibrium(A), (ii) ￿rst-best equilib-
rium, and (iii) bank run equilibrium. There is a clear welfare ranking: ￿rst-best equilibrium
is superior to an autarky, and an autarky is superior to an equilibrium with bank runs.
Figure1. Equilibrium types.
Goldstein and Pauzner [21] assume consumers do not have common knowledge regarding
the fundamentals of the economy, but instead receive noisy signals. The model with noisy
signals has a unique equilibrium in which the fundamentals determine whether a bank run
will occur.
Suppose the long-term technology has a random payo⁄:  with probability (￿) and 0,
otherwise. The state ￿ is random, and it is unknown before period 2. Consumer receives an
imperfect private signal ￿ about the true value of ￿, before he decides on whether or not
to withdraw his deposit. The signal has two e⁄ects. First, it provides information about
the fundamental (or the probability (￿) ). A larger signal implies a higher forecasted
probability, (￿)Consequently, the incentive to run on the bank by patient consumer who
receive the signal is reduced. Second, the signal provides information about the signals
received by others. The higher is the signal, the more probable is that others receive high
signals too. This e⁄ect also reduce the incentive of a patient consumer to run on the bank.
10There is consequently a unique threshold signal, ￿￿in which patient consumers run if they
observe a signal below certain threshold and do not run if above. A patient consumer￿ s
action is uniquely determined by his signal: he demands early withdrawal if and only if his
signal is below a certain threshold.
Speci￿cally, there are three regions of the fundamental. In the lower region, the bank is
insolvent and the run occurs. In the middle region, the bank is solvent, but only a fraction of
the late consumers withdraw their deposits. In the high region, a bank run does not occur.
As the signals are positively correlated with the fundamental ￿, the fraction of consumers
who withdraw their deposits in period one is decreasing in ￿: the higher is ￿ the lower is
the incentive to run. Therefore, the bank will take this probability into account in designing
deposit contracts and depositors will coordinate on ￿ as it provides information about the
signals received by others: the higher is ￿ the more likely others receive high ￿, hence, less
incentive to run.
The following two policy measures are adopted in order to prevent bank runs: suspension
of convertibility and deposit insurance. However, there costs associated with each policy.
Suspension of convertibility may deny consumption to agents who face early liquidity needs.
By providing deposit insurance the government eliminates runs in the middle region. How-
ever, the government creates moral hazard, providing an incentive for the bank to o⁄er an
excessively high deposit rate, which increases the region of insolvency. As a result, banks
become more vulnerable to runs when they o⁄er more risk sharing. Therefore, moral hazard
creates a systemic risk. The way to avoid this e⁄ect is to put restrictions on banks￿decision.
In the model, it means limiting the deposit rate.
3.2 Capital Flow Reversals
Banks tend to ￿nance long-term investment with short-term debt. Such debt maturity
structure makes ￿nancial institutions vulnerable to bank runs. Even a small shock may
result in ￿nancial distress, leading to costly asset liquidation and a large decline in asset
prices. Furthermore, domestic bank runs may interact with panics by foreign creditors.
Chang and Velasco [10] apply the Diamond-Dybvig model to international capital ￿ ows,
in order to explain sudden reversals of short-term international capital ￿ ows. They show
11that if the ￿nancial system￿ s potential short-term obligations exceed the liquidation value of
assets, the domestic ￿nancial system may collapse. For example, almost all of the countries
that experienced ￿nancial crises in 1990s had the combination of large short-term liabilities3
and relatively scarce internationally liquid assets (Furman and Stiglitz [20]). Furthermore,
in the economy which has access to the international capital markets, bank runs may be
associated with balance-of-payments crises and currency crises.
Chang and Velasco (1998) provides an analysis of how can capital mobility can cause a
collapse of a ￿xed exchange rate system. The ability of governments to come to the rescue
domestic banks under attack is severely limited by the availability of international reserves.
In the economy with ￿xed exchange rate regime, foreign currency out￿ ows put pressures on
the currency peg. If the probability that the currency crash increases, bank runs become
more likely, which in turn puts even more pressure on the currency. As a result, in emerging
economies ￿nancial crises are usually accompanied by a currency crisis.
Moreover, foreign creditors in emerging economies may have a better access to the world
capital markets than domestic investors. Therefore, foreign creditors may be more likely
to run on the bank than domestic creditors. With a high fraction of foreign credits, bank
failures may coincide with capital ￿ ow reversals, thereby creating a balance of payments
crisis. Krugman (2000) develop a general equilibrium model where the endogenously de-
termined real exchange rate interacts with the balance sheet of domestic investors, because
their borrowings ￿nanced by foreigners. A depreciation of the real exchange rate negatively
a⁄ects investors￿balance sheets, causing a sharp fall in investment spending. Self-ful￿lling
multiple equilibria ensue.
Real exchange depreciation may cause bank runs as well as aggravate their impact on
the economy. Since assets are typically denominated in the domestic currency while debt is
denominated in a foreign currency, an unanticipated depreciation or devaluation increases
the value of debt. For example, a substantial amount of debt denominated in a foreign
currency was a prominent feature of ￿nancial markets in Latin America in 1990s. (Mishkin
[36])
3In Mexico in 1995, Russia in 1998, and Brazil in 1999, the debt was mostly owned by government; in
Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand in 1997, it was primarily owned by private banks and ￿rms.
124 Equity Flows: Asymmetric Information and Liquidity
An empirical regularity is that the share of FDI in total foreign equity ￿ ows is larger
for developing countries than for developed countries. Regarding the second moments of
foreign equity ￿ ows, it is known that the volatility of FDI net in￿ ows is, in general, much
smaller than that of FPI net in￿ ows. Moreover, empirical analysis has established that
the di⁄erences in volatility between FPI and FDI ￿ ows are much smaller for developed
economies than for developing economies.
Rossi and Volpin [43] ￿nd that the volume of M&A activity is signi￿cantly larger in
countries with better corporate governance standards and stronger investor protection.
Albuquerque [4] argues that ￿nancially constrained countries borrow more through FDI
because FDI is harder to expropriate. Albuquerque, Loayza, and Serven [5] analyze the
dynamic of FDI in response to increased integration of capital markets. They ￿nd that
￿nancial integration increases the relative importance of global factors as drivers of foreign
investment. Furthermore, developing countries￿exposure to global factors has increased
faster than that of developed countries.
Goldstein and Razin [22] focus on the information-liquidity trade-o⁄ of FDI relative to
FPI. FDI investors are in e⁄ect the managers of the ￿rms under their control; whereas FPI
investors e⁄ectively delegate decisions to managers. Consequently, direct investors are more
informed than portfolio investors regarding the prospects of their projects. This informa-
tion enables direct investors to manage their projects more e¢ ciently.4 This informational
advantage, however, comes at a cost. If investors need to sell their investments before ma-
turity because of liquidity shocks, the price they can get will be typically lower when buyers
know that they have more information on the fundamentals of the investment project. A
key implication of the model is that the choice between FDI and FPI will be linked to the
likelihood with which investors expect to get a liquidity shock.
4The idea that control increases e¢ ciency and value of the ￿rm is supported empirically by recent papers
in the international ￿nance literature (Perez-Gonzalez (2005) and Chari, et al. (2005) ).
134.1 Information-Liquidity Trade-o⁄
Goldstein and Razin [22] consider a small economy faced by a continuum [01] of foreign
investors. Each foreign investor has an opportunity to invest in one investment project.
Foreign investment can occur in one of two forms: either as a direct investment or as a
portfolio investment. A direct investor e⁄ectively acts like a manager, whereas in case of a
portfolio investment, the project is managed by an outsider.
There are three periods of time: 0, 1, and 2. In period 0, each investor decides whether
to make a direct investment or a portfolio investment. In period 2, the project matures.
The net cash ￿ ow from the project is given by




where  is an idiosyncratic random productivity factor, which is independently realized
for each project in period 1, and  is the level of capital input invested in the project
in period 1, after the realization of . The parameter  re￿ ects production costs. The
productivity shock  is distributed between ¬1 and 1 with mean 0 with the cumulative
distribution function ￿(￿), and the density function is (￿) = ￿0(￿). Investors choose the
form of investment that maximizes (ex-ante) expected payo⁄.
In period 1, after the realization of the productivity shock, the manager of the project
observes . Thus, if the investor owns the project as a direct investment, she observes ,
and chooses , so as to maximize the net cash ￿ ow: () = 1+
 .










In the case of a portfolio investment, the owner has an arms length relationship with the
manager, and thus she cannot observe . In this case, the owner maximizes the expected
return absent any information on the realization of ; and decisions are based on the ex-
ante 0 mean. Thus, the manager will be instructed to choose  = (0) = 1
. Then, the





14Comparing (15) with (16), we see that if the project is held until maturity, it yields
a higher payo⁄ as a direct investment than as a portfolio investment. This re￿ ects the
e¢ ciency that results from a hands-on management style in the case of a direct investment.
There are also costs for FDI investment, however. First, an FDI investor has to incur a
￿xed cost in order to acquire the expertise to manage the project directly. We denote this
cost, which is exogenously given in the model, by . Second, there is an endogenous cost
arising from the possibility of liquidity shocks occurring in period 1. There is a discount
when selling a project managed as direct investment due to information asymmetries, as
demonstrated below.
In period 1, before the value of  is observed, the owner of the project might get a
liquidity shock. With the realization of a liquidity shock, the investor is forced to sell the
project in period 1. This feature of the model is similar to the preference-shock assumption
made by Diamond and Dybvig [14]: an investor who is subject to a liquidity shock derives
her utility only from period-one consumption. If, however, she is not subject to a liquidity
shock, she derives her utility from period-two consumption. We denote by ￿ the probability
of a liquidity shock. We assume that there are two types of foreign investors. In particular,
half of the investors will need to sell with probability ￿ and half with probability ￿ such
that 1  ￿  1
2  ￿  0, and ￿ + ￿ = 1. Investors know ex ante whether they are of
a ￿ type or a ￿ type and this is their private information. In addition to liquidity-based
sales, there is a possibility that an investor will liquidate a project in period 1 if she observes
a low realization of . Then the price that buyers are willing to pay for a direct investment






¬1 (1 + )
2 () + ￿
(1 ¬ ￿)￿() + ￿
 (17)
Here,  is a threshold level of , set by the direct investor; below which the direct
investor is selling the project without being forced to do so by a liquidity shock; ￿ is
the probability, as perceived by the market, that an FDI investor gets a liquidity shock.
In (17), it is assumed that if the project is sold due to a liquidity shock, that is, before
the initial owner observes , the value of  is not recorded in the ￿rms before the sale.
Therefore, the buyer does not know the value of . However, if the project is sold for low-
15pro￿tability reasons, the owner will know the value of  after the sale. The threshold  is
determined in equilibrium. The initial owner sets the threshold level , such that given
, when observing , an investor is indi⁄erent between selling and not selling the project






Equations (17) and (18) together determine  and  as functions of the market-perceived
probability of sale due to the liquidity shock (￿). We denote these functions as: (￿)
and (￿).
When a portfolio investor sells the projects in period 1, everybody knows she does it





Comparing the price of FDI, which is determined by (17) and (18), with the price of
FPI, which is determined by (19), we see that the resale price of a direct investment in
period 1 is always lower than the resale price of a portfolio investment in that period. The
intuition is that if a direct investor prematurely sells the investment project, the market
price must re￿ ect the possibility that the sale originates from inside information on low
prospects of this investment project. This constitutes the second (liquidity) cost of FDI.


























Then, the di⁄erence between the expected value of FDI and the expected value of FPI is:
 (￿￿) ￿  (￿￿) ¬ () (22)
Clearly, investors will choose FDI (FPI) when  (￿￿)  0 ( 0) and will be in-
di⁄erent between the two (that is, may choose either FDI or FPI) when  (￿￿) =
0.
16To complete the description of the equilibrium, it remains to specify how ￿, the market
perceived probability that an FDI investor will get a liquidity shock. Assuming that rational
expectations hold in equilibrium, ￿ has to be consistent with the equilibrium choice of the





where ￿ is the proportion of ￿ investors who choose FDI in equilibrium and ￿
is the proportion of ￿ investors who choose FDI in equilibrium.
There are ￿ve possible cases that can potentially be observed in equilibrium. Case 1:
All investors choose FDI. Case 2: ￿ investors choose FDI; ￿ investors split between FDI
and FPI. Case 3: ￿ investors choose FDI; ￿ investors choose FPI. Case 4: ￿ investors
split between FDI and FPI; ￿ investors choose FPI. Case 5: All investors choose FPI.
Equilibrium outcomes depend on production cost , and liquidity preferences (￿￿).
As the production cost  increases, we are more likely to observe FPI and less likely to
observe FDI in equilibrium. As the di⁄erence in liquidity needs between the two types of
investors increases, we are more likely to see a separating equilibrium, where di⁄erent types
of investors choose di⁄erent forms of investment.
Suppose now that an aggregate liquidity shock occurs in period one with probability .
Conditional on the realization of the aggregate liquidity shock, individual investors have to
sell their investment at period one with probabilities ￿ and ￿. This implies that as the
probability of an aggregate liquidity shock  increases, there will be more FPI and less FDI
in equilibrium. Thus, the ratio of FPI to FDI will increase. The intuition is that as the
probability of an aggregate liquidity shock increases, agents know that they are more likely
to sell the investment early, in which case they will get a low price since buyers do not know
whether they sell because of an individual liquidity need or because of adverse information
on the productivity of the investment. As a result, the attractiveness of FDI decreases.
The empirical prediction is that countries with a higher tendency for liquidity problems
will be source of a higher ratio of FPI to FDI. Goldstein, Razin, and Tong [23] ￿nd empirical
evidence that a higher probability of a liquidity crisis in the source country has a signi￿cant
positive e⁄ect on the ratio between FPI and FDI.
174.2 Equity Flows during Crises
Emerging economies have counter-cyclical current accounts and experience large capital
out￿ ows during crises. The theoretical literature argues that ￿nancial crises lead to an
exit of foreign investors even if there are no shocks to fundamentals. The following papers
link ￿nancial crises and liquidity through models of self-ful￿lling investor runs. Chang and
Velasco [10] place international illiquidity at the center of ￿nancial crises. They argue that
a small shock may result in ￿nancial distress, leading to costly asset liquidation, liquidity
crunch, and large drop in asset prices. Caballero and Krishnamurthy [9] argue that during
a crisis self-ful￿lling fears of insu¢ cient collateral may trigger a capital out￿ ow.
However, ￿nancial crises may be associated with an out￿ ow of FPI and a simultaneous
in￿ ow of FDI. This behavior re￿ ects the ￿re-sale FDI phenomenon when domestic com-
panies and assets are acquired by foreign investors at ￿re-sale prices. Krugman [31] notes
that the Asian ￿nancial crisis was accompanied by a wave of inward direct investment.
Furthermore, Aguiar and Gopinath [2] analyze data on mergers and acquisitions in East
Asia between 1996 and 1998 and ￿nd that the liquidity crisis is associated with an in￿ ow of
FDI. Moreover, Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer [1] observe that FDI in￿ ows during ￿nancial
crises are associated with acquisitions of controlling stakes. Baker, Foley, and Wurgler [7]
argue that FDI ￿ ows may also re￿ ect arbitrage activity by multinationals as well as the
purchase of undervalued host country assets.
Kirabaeva [27] developed a model to analyze the composition of investment (direct
vs portfolio) across two countries in the presence of heterogeneity in liquidity risk and
asymmetric information about the investment productivity. During liquidity crises (an
increase in liquidity preferences) the level of FDI may increase or decrease depending on
the equilibrium. The dual e⁄ect of an increase in the liquidity risk on the capital ￿ ows
corresponds to the empirically observed pattern of FDI during liquidity crises.5 The model
o⁄ers an alternative explanation of the ￿re-sale FDI phenomenon based on adverse selection.
5Financial crises may be associated with an out￿ ow of FPI and a simultaneous in￿ ow of FDI, e.g., the 1994
crisis in Mexico and the late 1990s crisis in South Korea. However, there is also evidence that some crises
have been accompanied by an out￿ ow foreign investment, including FDI, e.g., the 2001 crisis in Argentina
and 1990s crisis in Indonesia.
18At the same time, it provides the possibility of a decrease in FDI through self-ful￿lling
expectations.
The characteristic features of direct investment are higher pro￿tability and access to pri-
vate information about investment productivity. Portfolio investment represents holdings of
assets which allow for risk diversi￿cation (investing into multiple projects) and greater liq-
uidity. Taking advantage of the inside information, direct investors may sell low-productive
investments and keep the high-productive ones under their ownership. This generates a
"lemons"6 problem: the buyers do not know whether the investment being sold because of
its low productivity or due to an exogenous liquidity shock. Therefore, due to this infor-
mation asymmetry, there is a discount on the prematurely sold direct investment (relative
to the prematurely sold portfolio investment).
There are two types of equilibria. In the ￿rst type, only investors from the country with
a lower liquidity risk choose to hold direct investment. In the second type, investors from
both countries hold direct investments. In this case, there are strategic complementarity
in choosing direct investment. This generates a possibility of multiple equilibria through
the self-ful￿lling expectations. If countries have the same fundamentals, the country with
a higher liquidity risk attracts less inward foreign investment, but a larger share of it is in
the form of FDI. Also, the country with a higher level of asymmetric information about
investment productivity attracts more FDI relative to FPI since the marginal bene￿ts from
private information are larger.
These results are consistent with the empirical ￿ndings that countries that are less
￿nancially developed and have weaker ￿nancial institutions tend to attract more capital in
the form of FDI. Furthermore, it can explain the phenomenon of bilateral FDI ￿ ows among
developed countries, and one-way FDI ￿ ows from developed to emerging countries.
A crisis is associated with an increase in the liquidity risk. Such an increase results in
the drying up of market liquidity as more investors have to sell their risky asset holdings. At
the same time, it becomes more likely that if a direct investment is sold before maturity, it is
sold due to exogenous liquidity needs rather than an adverse information about investment
productivity. This reduces the adverse selection problem and therefore results in a smaller
6Akerlof (1970)
19discount on prematurely sold direct investments. This e⁄ect captures the phenomenon of
￿re-sale FDI during liquidity crises. If an economy is in the unique equilibrium then higher
liquidity risk leads to a higher level of FDI. However, if there are multiple equilibria then
FDI may decline as the liquidity risk becomes higher. In this case, an out￿ ow of FDI is
induced by self-ful￿lling expectations.
5 Moral Hazard and Limited Enforcement
With access to complete international credit markets, an economy would be able to borrow
to ￿nance a stable level of consumption and investment. However, empirical ￿ndings suggest
that countries often experience capital out￿ ows in very low income periods.
Eaton and Gersovitz [16] analyze a model with incomplete international credit market
and risk of repudiation. The level of debt is the minimum of the credit demands of the
economy and the credit constraints by lenders. Borrowing occurs in periods of relatively
low income and must be fully repaid in the following period. Failure to repay prevents
borrowing in the subsequent period. Atkeson [6] studies a model of lending that contains
both a moral hazard problem and an enforcement problem. The introduction of moral
hazard due to asymmetric information between borrower and lender, explains why the
occurrence of especially low output realizations prompt international lenders to ask these
countries for repayments. Tsyrennikov [46] shows that the capital out￿ ows in the lowest
output state in a model with only moral hazard can be quantitatively signi￿cant and larger
than in a model which also includes limited enforcement.
5.1 Atkeson (1991) model
A risk-averse borrower lives for  = 012. At period 0, he is endowed with  units
of the good, and in each period the borrower has access to the investment technology:
+1 = (+1) where  are units of goods invested and +1 is an i.i.d. random variable.
The probability density of +1 conditioned on I is (+1).7 The borrowers preferences
7Several assumptions are imposed on g(Y,I) to make the model tractable.
20are represented by (1 ¬ ￿)
1 X
=0
￿() where ￿ 2 (01)0()  000()  0.
In the autarky environment with no access to the international credit market, the opti-














Complete credit market The risk-neutral lender can observe the borrower￿ s investment
choice, and there is complete enforcement. The borrower can issue Arrow securities that
pay out  in state  and () is the price of such security given last period investment .
Since the lender is risk-neutral, the Arrow securities are priced such that () = ￿().
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where ￿ is the optimal investment level such that it maximizes the project present value








The borrower borrows a constant amount
X
 0
( 0￿)( 0) and invests ￿ each period,
and makes high repayment when 
0
is high and low repayment when 
0
is low. This is a
full-insurance solution.
Moral Hazard and Limited Enforcement Next consider the environment with moral
hazard: the lender cannot observe the investment choice  which a⁄ects the probability dis-
tribution of returns  ; and limited enforcement: the borrower can default on the promised
repayment.
The risk-neutral lender lives for two-periods and is endowed with  units of the good
in each period. He is willing to lend or borrow at the risk-free rate 1=￿. The lender observes
21 but does not observe  or . The optimal recursive contract takes the following form:
+1 = (+1) (26)
+1 = +1 ¬ +1
 = (+1)
 +  ¬  = 
The value function () satis￿es the following Bellman equation:
() = max
(
(1 ¬ ￿)() + ￿
X
 0
( 0 ¬ ( 0))( 0)
)
 ()  +  ¬  ￿  ￿ ¬( 0) ￿  ￿ 0 ￿ 0




()  [ 0 ¬ ( 0)] ￿ ( 0)
()  = argmax
(
(1 ¬ ￿)( +  ¬ ) + ￿
X
 0
( 0 ¬ ( 0))( 0)
)
(27)
The optimal contract can be constructed by iterating to convergence on constraint con-
ditions.





( +  ¬ ) + ￿
X
 0
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)
 (28)
and the participation constraint
() ￿ ( + ) (29)
Therefore, in the states with low output , we have  ￿ (), i.e., there are no capital
in￿ ows for these states.
Capital out￿ ows in bad times provide good incentives because they occur only at output
realizations so low that they are more likely to occur when the borrower has undertaken
too little investment. Their role is to provide incentives for the borrower to invest enough
to make it unlikely that those low-output states will occur.
226 Home Bias in Goods and Equity
With no information asymmetry, the home bias in the equity portfolio depends crucially
on the degree of market completeness.8 Despite the increased cross-border ￿nancial trans-
actions, international portfolios remain heavily tilted toward domestic assets.9 The liter-
ature on international portfolios emphasizes the link between home equity bias and home
consumption bias (Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ [38], Coeurdacier [12], Obstfeld [37], Engel and
Matsumoto [17]).
Coeurdacier [12] characterizes the constant equity portfolio that reproduces the locally
complete market allocation through trades in claims to domestic and foreign equities. The
structure of these optimal portfolios re￿ ects the hedging properties of relative equity re-
turns against real exchange rate ￿ uctuations. With CRRA preferences, the optimal equity
position is related to the covariance between the excess return on domestic equity (relative
to foreign equity), and the rate of change of the real exchange rate. When the CRRA
coe¢ cient exceeds unity, home equity bias arises when excess domestic equity returns are
positively correlated with an appreciation of the real exchange rate. In that case, e¢ cient
risk sharing requires that domestic consumption expenditures increase as the real exchange
rate appreciates. If domestic equity returns are high precisely at that time, domestic equity
provides the appropriate hedge against real exchange rate risk, and investors will tilt their
portfolio towards domestic equity.
Coeurdacier and Gourinchas [13] introduce an additional source of risk, so that the
optimal portfolio allocation will typically require simultaneous holdings of equities and
bonds. Since relative bond returns are strongly positively correlated with the real exchange
rate, it is optimal for investors to use bond positions to hedge real exchange rate risks while
equities are left to hedge the impact of additional sources of risk on investors￿total wealth.
This is consistent with the empirical ￿nding that correlation between excess equity returns
and the real exchange rate is too low to explain observed equity home bias (van Wincoop
and Warnock [47]).
Furthermore, they show that home equity bias arises if the correlation between the return
8The benchmark model without home bias in equity portfolio is in Helpman and Razin [26].
9See French and Poterba [18], Tesar and Werner [44], and Ahearne, Griever and Warnock [3].
23on non-￿nancial wealth and the return on equity, conditional on bond returns, is negative (a
generalization of both Baxter and Jermann [8], and Heathcote and Perri [25]).The reason
is that an increase in domestic equity holdings increases its implicit domestic currency
exposure. Investors optimally undo this exposure by shorting the domestic currency bond.
The overall domestic bond position re￿ ects the balance of these two e⁄ects, so it is possible
for a country to have short or long domestic currency debt positions. This is in line with
recent empirical evidence (Lane and Shambaugh [32] and Lane and Shambaugh [33]) that
suggests large heterogeneity across countries in the currency denomination of external bond
holdings. On average, advanced countries hold long (but small) domestic currency debt
positions but some large countries, most notably the US, are short in their own currency
debt.
To understand the relationship between home bias in goods and equities consider a
two-good world economy where output of the domestic and foreign goods are
(￿) = ￿(￿)
(￿) = ￿(￿)
where ￿ denotes the state of the world, ￿ is a random productivity factor, and  denote
output endowments of the domestic and foreign good,  and  , respectively. Domestic con-
sumers utility function is given by ((￿)(￿)), where (￿) denotes state ￿ consumption
of good  = . Thus goods-indi⁄erence curve is given by ((￿)(￿)) = .
A unit of domestic equity is a promise to give ￿(￿) units of the good in state of the
world ￿ Let ((￿);￿(￿) + (￿)￿(￿)) denote the indirect utility function, which
is derived from ((￿)(￿))where  is holdings of equity  =  in the portfolio.
The equity-indi⁄erence curve is given by ((￿);￿(￿) + (￿)￿(￿)) = .
Now assume that the domestic consumer is biased towards the domestically produced good,
which is the basis for returns ￿(￿), accruing to the domestic equity. Induced preference
over equities are then biased towards the home equity. In the diagram in Figure 3a we show
a good- indi⁄erence curve which is tilted towards the domestic good. The induced equity-
indi⁄erence curve, skewed towards the domestic equity, is shown in Figure 3b. Figures 3a
and 3b demonstrate the proposition that equity home bias is derived from good home bias.
24Coeurdacier and Gourinchas [13] consider a two-period endowment economy model.
There are two symmetric countries, Home () and Foreign (), each with a representa-
tive household. Each country specializes in the production of one tradable good. Agents
consume both goods with a preference towards the local good. In period zero, no output
is produced and no consumption takes place, but agents trade ￿nancial claims. In period
one, country  receives an exogenous endowment  of good . Countries are symmetric and
0() = 1 for both countries, where 0 is the conditional expectations￿operator, given
date  = 0 information. Once stochastic endowments are realized at period 1, households
consume using the revenues from their portfolio chosen in period 0 and their endowment
received in period 1. Country  household has the standard CRRA preferences.
The Home terms of trade, the relative price of the Home tradable good in terms of the
Foreign tradable good, is denoted by  ￿ . Trade in stocks and bonds occurs in
period 0. In each country there is one Lucas-style stock, a share ￿ of the endowment in
country  is distributed to stockholders as dividend, while a share (1¬￿) is not capitalizable
(labor income) and is distributed to households of country . The supply of each type of
share is normalized at unity. Agents can trade a bond in each country denominated in the
composite good of country . Buying one unit of the Home (Foreign) bond in period 0 gives
one unit of the Home composite (Foreign) good at  = 1. Both bonds are in zero net supply.
Initially, each household fully owns the local stock equity, and has zero initial foreign assets.
Denote a country￿ s holdings of local stock by , and its holdings of bonds denominated
in its local composite good by . The vector (;) thus describes international portfolios.
Symmetry of preferences and distributions of shocks implies that equilibrium portfolios are
symmetric.   12 means that there is equity home bias on stocks, while   0 means that
25a country issues bonds denominated in its local good, and simultaneously lends in units of
the foreign good. The equilibrium equity portfolio position (in the symmetric steady-state








(1 ¬ 1=￿)(2 ¬ 1)
￿ (1 ¬ ￿)
￿
(30)
where ￿ ￿ ￿
¬
1 ¬ (2 ¬ 1)2￿
+(2¬1)2=￿ represents the equilibrium terms of trade elasticity
of relative output.
When ￿  1, the optimal equity portfolio has two components. The ￿rst term inside
the brackets represents the position of a log-investor (￿ = 1). The domestic investor is
already endowed with an implicit equity position equal to (1 ¬ ￿)=￿ through non-￿nancial
income. O⁄setting this implicit equity holding and diversifying optimally implies a position
 = (2￿ ¬ 1)2￿  12 for ￿  1. The second component of the optimal equity portfolio
represents a hedge against real exchange rate ￿ uctuations. It only applies when ￿ 6= 1, i.e.,
when total consumption expenditures ￿ uctuate with the real exchange rate. This hedging
demand is a complex and non-linear function of the structure of preferences summarized
by the parameters ￿￿ and . For reasonable parameter values, this hedging demand can
contribute to home equity bias only when ￿  1, i.e. when the terms of trade impact of
relative supply shocks is large. Also, this hedge component can be rewritten as a function
of the covariance-variance ratio between excess equity returns and the real exchange rate.
Now consider the settings with bonds and an additional independent risk factor b . The
model can be summarized by the (log-linearized) inter-temporal allocation across goods and














b  = b  + b  +   0
b  (31)
b  = (2 ¬ 1) b  + b  +   0
b 
b  = b  + b  +   0
b 



























26where ￿￿￿ are asset returns loadings on the real exchange rate and on non-￿nancial income
such that
[  = ￿ b  + ￿ b  +  (33)
b  = ￿ b  + ￿ b  + 
The intuition is that the equilibrium bond and equity positions will hedge optimally the
components of real exchange rate and non-￿nancial income ￿ uctuations with which they are
correlated. Because bond returns o⁄er a better hedge against real exchange rate risk than
equities, holdings of equities take care of the exposure to other sources of risk, conditional
on bond returns. Home equity bias will arise when ()  0.
7 Conclusion
In this survey focus on key mechanisms through which market frictions such as information
imperfections and liquidity shocks a⁄ect composition of international capital ￿ ows. To o⁄er
a self-contained presentations, we selected only a few stylized models (a small subset of the
wide range of models in the literature). Selection of models is guided by the unique and
empirically-relevant features they convey, so that they help the reader distinguish the major
types of capital ￿ ows. The topic of global imbalances, typically associated with reversal of
net capital ￿ ows, remains outside the focus of our survey.
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